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MINUTES OF MEETING
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON CIA INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
23 August 1972

STATINTL Present: Walter Pforzheimer
Robert S. Wattles



Chairman

STATINTL

Review of Cuban Missile Crisis Exhibit:

[REDACTED] and members of his staff reviewed for the committee the state of planning for the Cuban Missile Crisis Exhibit. Everything seems to be progressing in good order.

[REDACTED] will work with [REDACTED] to clear up certain security questions pertaining to the exhibit materials. [REDACTED] is to arrange a meeting with Mr. Angleton on security questions relating to the papers, the latter to be brought to the meeting by [REDACTED]

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Charter for the Intelligence Museum Commission:

The committee considered a draft paper prepared by Mr. [REDACTED] presented in the form of a memo from the Executive Director to the Deputies and embracing the plans for the establishment of the commission. The attached draft is presumed to represent the agreed amendments to [REDACTED] draft. The Chairman stated he would forward this draft to the Executive Director as recommended by the committee.

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Chairman

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
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TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
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CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

*Re your last
Re para, please cut me
in too. I find that DDP
is even more adamantly
opposed to the Historical Staff
solution than I'd assumed.*

FOLD HERE TO

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE	
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MINUTES
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
2 August 1972

Present: Walter Pforzheimer

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[REDACTED]
Chairman

CIA Anniversary Exhibit:

Mr. Pforzheimer reviewed his plans for this exhibit which he proposes be in place on September 12.

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Cuban Missile Crisis Exhibit:

[REDACTED] with his colleagues, briefed the Committee on the development of plans for this exhibit. Everything seems in good order and the committee had no comment except commendation for the work they had done.

Proposal to Locate the Intelligence Museum Function in the Historical Staff:

Members had received copies of the memorandum from the Executive Director proposing the location of the Intelligence Museum function in the Historical Staff. Mr. Pforzheimer, speaking also for [REDACTED] who was on leave, was strongly opposed to the Executive Director's proposal.

After extensive discussion the Chairman proposed that he review this discussion with the Executive Director orally and that he seek to arrange with Mr. Colby for a discussion either with all of the members of the Museum Committee, or at least Messrs. Pforzheimer and [REDACTED] so that their point might be most effectively made.

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Chairman

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COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

Attached see Mr. Colby's response to
 our memorandum of 30 June 1972, Sub-
 ject: Intelligence Museum Concept.

STATINTL

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.		DATE	
Chairman, Fine Arts Commission		24Jul72	
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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
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18 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Fine Arts Commission

SUBJECT : The Intelligence Museum

REFERENCE : Memo to ExDir from C/FAC dtd 30 Jun 72,
Subj: Intelligence Museum Concept

1. Thank you for this excellent review. Your points with respect to the need to capture our material as the first priority are well taken, arranging the showing of it later as appropriate. Also, I think it important that we recognize the compartmented nature of the Agency at work and not try to centralize all the material in one Agency museum.

2. The organizational problem of how to approach this subject is closely analogous to that of the production of Agency histories. Here we have the same compartmentation problem, central indexing, early capture, etc. In addition, I confess some disinclination to seeing the establishment of separate committees or commissions when the function can be consolidated into an existing one.

3. I would suggest, therefore, that we use the Historical Program as the vehicle for developing a museum program. The Historical Program already has an Agency Historical Staff, Directorate Historical Officers, etc. I would thus suggest that, after these initial probes into the general subject, we bring this matter under the aegis of the Historical Staff and Program for continued movement along the excellent lines you have outlined.

4. Could you review these papers with this thought in mind, after which we will have a basis upon which to go to the Deputies.


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 W. E. Colby
 Executive Director-Comptroller

Attachment:

Reference

cc: Chief, Historical Staff


 EXEMPT FROM INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
 57 E.O. 14176, E 27 JULY 1967
 § 52.6(j) (1) (ii) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I)
 (ii) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I)

 Approval of DCT
 (Date in ink, initial, stamp date or other)

S. S. [Signature]

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30 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT: Intelligence Museum Concept

The attached concept paper by [REDACTED] identifies a set of principles connected with the establishment of an historical museum which I would like to recommend to you. They are:

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1. Some offices - Communications is an example - have taken an historical view and already have begun to preserve technical gear which in its day raised the technology of communication to a higher plateau, or gear which has been used in notable operational cases. Other offices with less sense of history have no such program, and already may have lost or destroyed material which played a significant role in CIA's history, then became outmoded and was discarded.

*1. Identify
and
2. Preserve*
2. The task we must undertake then, well before we talk about a museum, is to identify, and tag for non-destruction, all material which is important to the history of CIA's operational development, before the material finally vanishes. This effort would involve documents, photographs, hardware and other materiel, vehicles and miscellaneous memorabilia, all henceforth called "historical material."

3. Exhibition - the concept of a museum - is a by-product of preservation. At least initially emphasis should be given to the primary task of identifying historical material in order to arrange for its preservation, rather than to the luxury of exhibiting it. This sequence should help deflect a natural concern that the security of a sensitive device, even an outmoded one, machined into one or another piece of intelligence collection may be threatened by exhibiting in a museum. For this reason we see the museum as evolving slowly, and perhaps at several security levels.

4. The basic museum as we visualize it would not be a static collection. Instead it would be a series of displays using declassified historical material which would be

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rotated in and out of the conservancy collection. (The forthcoming exhibit of Cuban Missile Crisis photographs and hardware is a good example of endlessly interesting material which once was highly classified but now can be shown in this way.) A possible adjunct to the basic museum collection would be a small museum which we understand the DCI wants near his office, in which he could show Agency achievements to selected visitors. Other additions to the basic museum would be the small specialized museums which already exist, such as the [REDACTED] a small TSD collection [REDACTED] and the OTR museum at [REDACTED]. Such satellite museums in our opinion should continue, and should not be superseded by a central museum. In fact we would expect these satellite museums to provide exhibits to the central museum, and to whatever small classified museum is created for the DCI.

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5. No central repository need be established for all material which is designated as historical. Offices which have the space and interest in housing their own historical material (Commo, OTR, and TSD are examples) may wish to retain custody of it, so long as all items which have been accorded historical material status are recognized as being under the ultimate control of the central Agency collection. Nevertheless, at least one storage site will have to be established for the historical material from offices which lack storage space of their own. [REDACTED] is a possible site. Special storage arrangement may have to be made from time to time for especially sensitive items.

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6. In summary we see the problem as the following:

- a. Identifying, cataloguing and ~~preserving~~ documents, photographs, hardware and other materiel, vehicles and miscellaneous memorabilia which have been significant in the development of CIA and its operations;
- b. Arranging for their progressive declassification, on terms agreed to by whichever directorate used the material operationally; and
- c. Exhibiting the material when exhibition would have a salutary effect on employee morale, on training, or on special problems the DCI identifies.

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We believe that a one-shot exhibit such as the Cuban Missile Crisis can be arranged under the aegis of the Intelligence Museum Committee, as is being done, but that the larger problem needs the attention of a separate commission which will attend not just to the last but to all three of the foregoing functions. Furthermore, we think it important to find a senior officer to chair the historical material commission and actively to head the program, whom the directores will trust with the custody of historical material items which in some cases may be politically sensitive as well as highly classified. Our guess is that either the commission chairman or alternatively a curator working under his guidance will have to be employed full-time.

6. If you agree that the foregoing principles are a reasonable basis for further action I suggest that they be distributed to the deputy directors for comment, and for their recommendations of candidates to take the commission chairmanship and get the program rolling.

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[REDACTED]

Chairman, Fine Arts Commission

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12 June 1972

CIA HISTORICAL MUSEUM

If a CIA Historical Museum is to be established, prompt action is required to collect significant material before it is discarded. As each day passes, it becomes clearer that positive steps must be taken if such intelligence hardware and related items of historical interest are to be preserved.

As an example consider audio surveillance equipment. When integrated circuits in the last few years replaced transistorized equipment which in the late fifties had rendered vacuum tube devices obsolete, it was only natural that as this evolution took place earlier equipment was cannibalized or disposed of. While some of the original audio gear can perhaps still be located, as each month goes by it becomes more and more difficult to assemble an historical collection of eavesdropping equipment used or designed by CIA during the past 25 years. If another 10 years is allowed to pass the earliest equipment will certainly have vanished.

Only the establishment of a CIA Historical Museum can lead to the orderly identification of significant historical items and their proper preservation. The problem permeates all directorates of the Agency since candidate material would come from TSD, Commo, NPIC, and perhaps offices which would not immediately come to mind, such as Medics, Logistics, and even General Counsel.

Security considerations impose constraints which do not apply to conventional museums. Some unclassified CIA material could surely be brought together for immediate display in the main lobby of the Headquarters building where it would be visible to uncleared visitors. By far the bulk of the items, however, is classified and these presumably would not be candidates for exhibition for several or even a great many years. In some instances it would be difficult to imagine that certain items could ever be displayed to uncleared personnel, but this fact should not prevent the material from being identified and preserved for classified exhibitions.

These peculiar security considerations surrounding espionage material require a correspondingly unusual organizational set-up for the Museum. While it would be better to assemble material in a central location, the sensitive nature of some items might be such that the directorate wherein they originate may wish to retain custody of them. In this case, the curator would be responsible for locating and identifying items which must be preserved and may not be destroyed without approval of the Museum.

Less sensitive material could be assembled in a holding area where the passage of 5, 10, or 50 years could be expected to result in their gradual declassification. During World War II members of OSS would have shuddered at the suggestion that their equipment could ever be openly displayed to the public. While this is not yet true in all cases, many items such as the crossbow and one-shot pistol certainly are no longer SECRET. Sabotage techniques used by OSS have appeared many times in the press, TV, and movies and the original security classifications certainly no longer need apply. This question unfortunately is academic since it is highly unlikely that any of this gear has survived and could be added to the Museum.

With a few exceptions such as the U-2 reconnaissance plane of the TSD [redacted] most of the material would not pose a warehousing problem. It will be necessary, however, to store the material selected for the Museum so as to avoid deterioration. In all cases it will be mandatory to catalog and document the items and establish their provenance.

It would be impossible for the establishment of the Museum and organization of periodic exhibitions to be handled by an individual on a part-time basis. A full-time curator with access to clerical assistance, Printing Services, maintenance personnel, etc., is required. An experienced museum curator or conservator would find no difficulty in setting up the Agency collection. Since it is unlikely that such a person is already employed by CIA, it may be necessary to identify a candidate for the position and detail him or her to the Smithsonian Institution for several months of familiarization and training. Alternately, the Smithsonian would no doubt be willing to furnish a consultant who would, of course, require clearance.

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The curator of the Museum would work closely with the Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection (HIC), to avoid over-

[REDACTED]

should come under the jurisdiction of the Museum or the HIC. Some items of importance including perhaps early directives or instructions received from the White House most certainly should be preserved, as should photographs or portraits of senior executive personnel.

Candidate material would include captured Soviet equipment such as audio surveillance devices, photographic gear, or assassination weapons. Material issued to a CIA agent and returned after a successful operation is obviously of great interest, as would be his actual photographs, microdots, or deaddrop concealments. The list of desiderata is long, but before it can be drawn up the Museum must be established to prevent further loss of desirable items.